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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2017, the United States Senate considered a bill that
would significantly change healthcare policy in the country.' This began in
2009 and 2010 when Democrats in Congress and from President Obama's
White House crafted the Affordable Care Act. 2 That process was the
subject of criticism for its lack of transparency, seen as backroom secrecy
designed to avoid public debate. ' Fast forward to spring 2017, as
Republicans in Congress and from President Trump's White House pushed
another healthcare bill. 4 In 2017, the same Republicans who criticized
secrecy practiced it; the same Democrats who practiced it have criticized
it.' This is remarkably articulate hypocrisy, even for Washington, D.C. It
clearly spotlights a procedural breach in which policymakers focus squarely
on the outcomes of the policymaking process and ignore satisfaction with
the process itself.
Scholars have long understood the importance of procedure. The legal
and psychological literatures include robust consideration of procedural
fairness.6 But the concept of hypocrisy-so abundant in politics-provides
additional and novel insight into the appropriateness, legitimacy, and worth
of policy instruments.
New research from psychologist Jillian Jordan and colleagues at Yale
University reinforces that people hate hypocrisy, and suggests that the
hatred is not because hypocrisy is ineffective or because hypocrisy
demonstrates any specific instrumental weakness.' Hypocrisy is condemned

1. Eg., Thomas Kaplan & Robert Pear, Vote Delayed as G.O.P Struggles to MarshalSupport
for Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/us/politics/repu
blicans-struggle-to-marshal-votes-for-health-care-bill.html (noting the "Republicans' seven-year effort
to dismantle" the Affordable Care Act.).
2. E.g, Aaron Blake, 20 GOP Criticismsof Obamacare'sSecrecy that Now Look Eerily
Hypocritical,WASH. POST (June 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017
/06/20/20-gop-criticisms-of-obamacares-secrecy-that-now-look-eerily-hypocritical/?utmterm=.740
88af0b405 (suggesting that Democrats secretly passed the Affordable Care Act).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Eg, JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 102-03 (1975) [hereinafter THIBAUT & WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE] (appraising the

procedural system ofjustice); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV.
541 (1978) [hereinafter Thibaut & Walker, A Theory] (suggesting that procedure is an avenue for
resolving legal disputes); ToM R. TYLER, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1998)

(pointing out literature on procedural fairness).
7. JILLIAN JORDAN, ET AL., WHY Do WE HATE HYPOCRITES? EVIDENCE FOR A THEORY OF
FALSE SIGNALING 1 (Association for Psychological Science, 2017) [hereinafter JORDAN, FALSE
SIGNALING].

Value ofHypocrisy andPolicy Sincerity

2017)]

347

and unsatisfying because it is an intentional disconnect between the values
signaled in words and achieved in deeds.' We condemn an intentional
disconnect between words and deeds, even if the hypocritical deeds are in
some way useful. ' Thus, a policymaking process, such as that around
healthcare, which signals transparency but practices secrecy, is unwanted
hypocrisy regardless of one's preference for more or less government
involvement in health insurance. This Article argues that the concept of
hypocrisy is a useful analytical tool in policymaking and policy advocacy.
The problem of hypocrisy in policymaking is obvious in the policy
process, where the words and behaviors of politicians are so often in
opposition.'o But this Article goes deeper to focus on hypocrisy in policyinstrument choice. A set of public values will motivate any given policy
goal. For instance, the inherent rights of nature may influence the goal of
better environmental quality." The instrument used to achieve the policy
goal may or may not embody those same public values. Tradable pollution
permits can achieve the goal of environmental protection, 12
but buying and selling pollution may also undermine rights of nature as a
motivating value. 3 Hypocrisy arises here when the values of the instrument
do not match the values that motivate the goal. Thus, to avoid hypocrisy,
policymakers should develop and use policy instruments (roughly
equivalent to an individual's deeds) that reflect the values that motivate the
policy goals (roughly equivalent to an individual's words).
Drawing on the new Yale psychology research suggesting that people
decry hypocrisy because of the disconnect between personal signaling and
personal deeds, we might call the disconnects between the values sought in
policy goals and the values reflected in policy instruments value
hypocrisy.'4 We may then call the alternative policy sincerity, in which the
disconnect closes and the values that motivate a policy goal are embedded
in the policy instrument.
The word values can raise more questions than it answers. To avoid
unnecessary confusion, throughout this article, the standard dictionary
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id.
11.

Anthony Weston, Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics, 7 ENVTL.

ETHICS 321, 323, 337 (1985).
12. E.g., Eric Pooley, 15 Years of "Ways That Work" for People and Planet, ENVTL. DEF.
FUND (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.edf.org/blog/2014/09/12/15-years-ways-work-people-and-planet
(providing examples of economic mechanisms to protect the environment).
13. E.g., Kirk Junker, EthicalEmissions Trading and the Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 149,
170 (2006) (discussing how market price may motivate emission reduction more than environmental
reasons).
14.

JORDAN, FALSE SIGNALING, supra note 7.
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definition applies. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "values" as "the
principles or standards of a person or society, the personal or societal
judgment of what is valuable and important in life."" Values, therefore,
simply means the ideals, ethics, beliefs, opinions, or basic criteria people
use for deciding what they want.
Given the unique importance of food to our bare survival and frivolous
indulgences, this Article introduces hypocrisy as an analytical tool for
instrument choice by using the area of food law and policy as a case study.
For example, Wal-Mart's foray into the local food movement and the
United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) National Organic
Program breathe life into what have so far been general assertions. 16In
2010, Wal-Mart announced a program to double its sales of locally grown
produce. " While this program could have a range of outcomes-from
economic growth to sustainability benefits"-if the values that motivate
local food activists are closer connections to farmers, or transparency in
production, the giant retailer's new program would not reflect those
motivators. In organic agriculture, the USDA's organic seal is now a
ubiquitous symbol." The seal announces that farmers followed certain rules
in raising or growing their products.20 If the value that motivates organic
production is consistency, then a uniform federal National Organic Program
probably advances this value. But, if the values include individuality, then
the National Organic Program fails to capture this value.21 In other words,
in both the private strategies of Wal-Mart or the public policies of the
National Organics Program, there may be hypocrisy.
This Article makes two points about the connection between policy
instruments and their motivating values. First, and most importantly,
analysis of policy-instrument choice tends to focus on the ability of the
instrument to achieve the policy goal. I argue that the non-instrumental
nature of the policy tool-its value sincerity-deserves increased attention.
That is to say, an instrument that can achieve a stated goal may nevertheless
be suboptimal if it does not fit with the values that motivate the policy goal
15.

Values, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).

16. Stephanie Clifford, Wal-Mart to Buy More Local Produce,N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/business/I 5walmart.html?mcubz-2.
17. Id.
18. Id
19. USDA Reports Record Growth in U.S. Organic Products, USDA (April 4, 2016),
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2016/04/04/usda-reports-record-growth-us-organicproducers.
20.

SUSAN

A.

SCHNEIDER,

FOOD,

FARMING,

AND

SUSTAINABILITY:

READINGS

IN

AGRICULTURE LAW 662-64 (2d ed. 2016).
21. See id. at 662 (emphasizing the uniform standards that the Organic Foods Production Act
of 1990 sought to impose on all producers).
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in the first place. This Article's second point, which should serve as a case
study to illuminate the first, is that common law litigation deserves more
consideration as a food law and policy instrument because-in addition to
consequential benefits of the common law-the common law fits well with
the values such as community empowerment, participatory decisionmaking, and progressive traditionalism that motivate the food movement.
Section I of this Article surveys the ways in which policymaking
strategies and legal doctrines intentionally prioritize either process or
consequences, but always see these two foci as linear rather than reflexive.
This view should contextualize the ideas of value hypocrisy and policy
sincerity by distinguishing the common focus on an instrument's
effectiveness from a renewed focus on an instrument's sincerity. Section II
introduces the food movement as a case study, and seeks to approximately
define the movement's policy goals and motivating values in order to assess
how these values fit with different policy instruments. Section fII looks
closely at the common law, with a special emphasis on tort law as a policy
tool. This section reviews theories of common law and the values that are
part of common law jurisprudence. Section IV first explores the existing
literature on the role of common law to advance food policy, concluding
that while the little analysis that exists does support the use of common law,
it uses an instrumentalist approach. Far from condemning this approach,
Section IV affirms the current literature and the instrumental importance of
common law as a food-policy tool-and enhances this conclusion-arguing
that by fitting values between tool and goals, the common law can offer
significant and additional instrumental and non-instrumental benefits to the
food movement.
I. PROCESS AND OUTCOME, NOT PROCESS THEN OUTCOME

The exploration of laws as tools for desirable outcomes and as
inherently justifiable restrictions is not in the least bit new.22 This section
will briefly describe perspectives on this subject and will compare these
perspectives with the new value hypocrisy and policy sincerity approach,
which recommends instrument choice as a self-justifying component of
policy. A key purpose of this section is to demonstrate that, while we often
expect outcomes to define which laws are just, just laws can also arise from
processes. If we acknowledge the importance of process, it is only a small
22. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 104-10 (Mary Gregor trans.,
1996) (indicating that the law can be used as a vehicle for implementing sound policy changes); PLATO,
LAWS IN PLATO: THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 1486 (A. E. Taylor trans., 1961) (describing the ways in
which laws may not only restrict conduct but also maintain an orderly society).
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step to accepting that the appropriateness of a legal instrument can also
arise from the instrument's sincerity to motivating values.
A. GoalSetting
Two competing philosophical commitments-deontology and
consequentialism-structure the conversation around both setting goals and
designing policy to achieve those goals.2 3 To begin, society or lawmakers
should have a justification for asserting that a specific policy goal is
desirable. A goal of making homicide illegal and designing punishments to
match is to announce and assure that unjustified killing is not welcome in
society.24 But to justify this goal, it is helpful to understand why stopping
murder is valid in the first place. 25
Deontology and consequentialism provide alternative explanations.
The distinction here is between a moral philosophy that values a behavior
as right or wrong, in and of itself, and a philosophy that values behavior as
a means to achieving a distinct end. 26 For example, presuming that a person
has committed a crime, the deontological perspective asserts that the law
should punish the criminal because she has done wrong and deserves
punishment.27 A consequentialist perspective asserts that the law should
punish the criminal because punishment will achieve a desired result, most
often deterrence from future criminal activity. 28
An ethical justification for a specific policy goal provides a baseline
from which to assess a law's underlying validity and effectiveness; but
regardless of the nature of that justification, once a goal is set, lawmaking
becomes a process of designing a tool for achieving that goal, and in this
sense lawmaking is always at least partially consequentialist. 29 Put more
plainly, the process of designing a specific instrument to achieve a specific
goal requires careful consideration of whether the instrument will do what it
is supposed to do.
The specific goal of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, for example,
was to protect the public from "adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or
23. KANT, supranote 22, at 107.
24. E.g., id. (providing an example of how death as punishment would dissuade someone from
committing murder).
25. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 126 (6th ed. 2012) (describing

that the overall goal of punishment-i.e., what it seeks to accomplish-is key in its application).
26. Id at 125-26.
27. Id. at 125.
28. Id. at 127.
29. See id at 126 ("Any evaluation of punishment which focuses on its future effects will be
based on an express or implied foundation of consequentialism.").
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deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and liquors . . . ."3 Whether the ethical

justification for this goal was that (1) there is an inherent right to have safe
food; (2) manufacturers have an ethical duty to provide safe food; or (3) a
safe food supply reduces healthcare costs, produces fit workers, and spurs a
stronger economy, once there is a goal in mind, the primary inquiry is how
to achieve it. In the service of assuring safe food, Congress made it
unlawful to sell, transport, or manufacture these undesirable products. 3 1
Future congresses were then able to judge the prohibitions by their ability to
protect the food supply and, by 1936, did indeed find that the Act was
insufficient with respect to its stated goals.3 2
B. InstrumentBuilding
Within this narrower inquiry into a legal instrument's ability to achieve
its specific goals there are competing ideas about what strategies are best.
In some cases these ideas are grounded in moral philosophy,3 3 and in other
cases they vary based on the specific policy goal and are untethered from
broader ethical commitments. 3 4 Some strategies look keenly at, and give
priority to, what the law will do, and other strategies prioritize how the law
will do it. Put differently, the what strategies imply that carefully predicting
outcomes will assure the best results, while the how strategies imply that
carefully designing processes will assure the best results. Neither is
ignorant of the other, and neither pretends that only process or only
outcome is relevant. Each merely prioritizes and focuses on different
aspects of lawmaking.
Law and economics analysis, for instance, and the related cost-benefit
analysis, appraise outcomes (what a law will do) to maximize efficient
resource use. " Cost-benefit analysis, as one way of implementing an
economic view of policy instruments, asks policymakers "to assess the
30. Pure Food Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 5-7, 14-15
(repealed 1938).
3 1. Id.
32. Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation of
Adulteration and MisbrandingofFood, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 2,61-62 (1984).
33.

E.g., DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE

SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 71-72 (2010) (discussing a law's ability to achieve specific goals grounded
in moral philosophy).
34. E.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through, " 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79,
79 (1959) (showing how policy goals are untethered from broader ethical commitments).
35. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 115 (1981) (advancing a moral
theory that maximized the wealth of society); KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND

EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 24 (1988) (suggesting that common law promotes economic
efficiency because it distributes resources effectively).
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costs and benefits of various standards and to select the standard
that ... maximizes overall social welfare." 36 In law and economics
generally, or cost-benefit analysis specifically, the focus of policy analysis
is not primarily on the design of the law, but the impacts of the law." Legal
pragmatism has a similar focus." Legal pragmatists such as Richard Posner
and Oliver Wendell Holmes before him caution that overreliance on
theoretical or procedural strictures distracts from the more important
inquiry of whether the legal rules produce the desired results.39
Alternative analytical strategies focus more on the nature of the legal
instrument and process. 40 Proponents of deliberative democracy explain
that legal instruments prioritizing discourse, articulation, and justification
will deliver better and more legitimate results.

41

Approaching process

prioritization with a different strategy, Professor Daniel Farber crafted
"ecopragmitism" as an analytical tool that explicitly relies on the public
preference for environmental protection not just "to control the results of
cases, but also to leave us satisfied with the process of reaching the
result."

42

This sort of thinking is also evident in American criminal

procedure, which self-consciously accepts that strict adherence to
procedural safeguards can more effectively deliver justice than prioritizing
the immediate outcome of an individual conviction.4 3
Procedural justice, or procedural utility in the economics literature, is
one of the most vigorous areas of analysis on process distinct from
outcomes. 44 For instance, Tom Tyler's research demonstrates the
importance of subjectively fair processes for generating policy legitimacy. 45
Tyler points specifically to objective procedural components that can

36. KYSARsupra note 33, at 7.
37. Id. at 7, 9.
38. See Bix, supra note 25, at 284 (describing the cost-benefit analysis as applied to legal
pragmatism).
39. Id.
40. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 113 (1999) [hereinafter EcO-PRAGMATISM].

41. Melissa Mortazavi, Tort as Democracy: Lessons from the Food Wars, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
929, 936 (2015).
42. EcO-PRAGMATISM, supra note 40, at 113.
43. See e.g., Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine: Excluding
Evidence Derivedfrom Information Gained in Illegal Search, 43 A.L.R.3d 385, §2[a] (1972) (indicating
that evidence will be excluded if gathered in a procedurally incorrect manner).
44. E.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 7-8 (discussing

procedural choices and relating outcomes); Thibaut & Walker, A Theory, supra note 6, (asserting that
the goal of procedure is justice through the legal system); TYLER, supranote 6 (providing an example of
procedural justice literature and showing how fair processes generate policy legitimacy).
45. TYLER, supranote 6, at 11-12.
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advance subjective feelings of fair process. 46 These procedural components
include opportunities for input, transparency, understandability, neutrality,
objectivity, and consistency. 47 However, the procedural justice literature
primarily recognizes the value of procedure for improving compliance and,
therefore, improving policy efficiency and outcomes.48
Neil Komesar's comparative institutional analysis is a hybrid method,
combining institutional process and goal orientation, asking which
institution-i.e., a court, market, legislature, or regulator-is best
positioned to deliver a specific goal.49 The polestar of comparing these
institutions is their "dynamics of institutional participation." 0 Komesar's
analysis asks decision makers to focus on: "Who transacts? Who litigates?
Who votes, organizes or lobbies?" What are the costs and benefits of this
participation?" Looking at the distribution of this participation and the
costs and benefits thereof, one can better understand the appropriate
institution for achieving an explicit policy goal.52
In a way, the consideration of value hypocrisy is a subspecies of this
comparative analysis, insofar as both ask the decision maker to focus on
matching tools and goals. The key point of distinction (explained more in
the remainder of this Article) is that value hypocrisy analysis does not focus
precisely on goals as much as the values that motivate those goals. 5
Nevertheless, Komesar's project offers an example that moves a step closer
to the framework of hypocrisy and sincerity. As Professor Komesar
explains, understanding only a policy goal misses the point if we do not
seek to understand the institution that will best get us to that goal.54
This section's overview of instrument selection spotlights largely linear
policy analysis. The limited analysis here begins with a policy goal, which
might be justified by any number of ethical commitments, including
deontology and consequentialism. With the immediate goal established, the
second inquiry is what instrument will best achieve that goal. Instrument
choice prioritizes a prediction of the outcome, as is the case with costbenefit analysis, or it prioritizes the nature of the process, as is the case with

46. Id at 12.
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id. at 4.
49. See, e.g., Neil Komesar, Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional
Choice, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 465, 466 (1997) (explaining how hybrid institutional analysis is a balance
between process and goals).
50. Id. at 471.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 466, 468.
54. Id. at 466, 468-71.
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democracy and procedural justice. While they do respect the
positioning of participants, even the process-focused
and Komesar's hybrid institutional analysis, do not fully
importance of harmonizing the values that motivate a policy
values inherent in the policy instrument.
C. Value Fittingand Sincerity

The concept of value hypocrisy and policy sincerity offers a way to fit
instruments and goals by instrcting advocates and policymakers to
uncover motivating values and to design instruments that advance these
same values. The focus on value hypocrisy and policy sincerity that I
develop here benefits from scholarship in areas like deliberative democracy
and procedural justice, but I propose to expand the list of arguments in
favor of non-consequentialist policy analysis. I propose that by identifying
the social values that motivate policy advocacy, and by seeking policy
instruments that are harmonious with those values, policymakers and
advocates can leverage new opportunities to advance social goals through
policy outcomes and through mere implementation of the policy, regardless
of outcome. In this regard, the new analysis looks beyond a means-ends
distinction and asks not only whether the instrument can achieve the goal,
but also whether it is a sincere adherence to the goal's underlying purpose.
In the remainder of this Article, I will develop and test this reflexive
approach. Food law and policy makes a good case study for this effort
because, as an area of scholarship and as a movement, it is still in its
infancy," its motivations are diverse, 6 it is still struggling to find the best
legal instruments," and its participants and practitioners are communicative
about their motivating values.58

55. Baylen J. Linnekin & Emily M. Broad Leib, Food Law & Policy: The Fertile Field's
Originsand FirstDecade, 2014 Wis. L. REv. 557, 595 (2014).
56. Laurie Ristino, Back to the New: Millennials and the Sustainable FoodMovement, 15 VT.
J. ENVTL. L. 1, 21 (2013).
57. Id. at 20.
58. E.g., Michael Pollan, The Food Movement Rising, N.Y. REV. BOOKs (June 10, 2010),
("[Flood
in
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/06/1 0/food-movement-rising/?printpage--true
America has been more or less invisible, politically speaking, until very recently."); Stephanie Tai, The
Rise of US. Food Sustainability Litigation, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (2012) (demonstrating the
various reasons people join the food movement).

2017]
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II. CHARACTERIZING THE FOOD MOVEMENT

Every area of law has its unavoidable tropes. In food law and policy,
the trope is that the food movement-if such a thing exists-is diverse,
conflicted, and unwieldy." Nevertheless, the purpose of this section is to
try and characterize the movement, first by the types of policy goals it
declares and then through a deeper look at the values that motivate it. This
may be an impossible feat, as the trope suggests. But drawing on the legal
literature for recurring themes and sociological literature for more
disciplined assessment, this section should at least outline a justifiable
perspective on some values common to many participants within the food
movement. Certainly, there is need for deeper primary research on this
subject.
There is at least something like a food movement, and also a growing
professional field of food law and policy. 6 o The field of food law and policy

is more clearly defined, and given the substantive overlap, understanding
the movement is easiest if it begins with a fairly simple definition of the
subject. Food law and policy "is the study of the basis and impact of those
laws and regulations that govern the food and beverages we grow, raise,
produce, transport, buy, sell, distribute, share, cook, eat, and drink."61 The
field includes the longstanding areas of agriculture law and food and drug
law, but it goes beyond, including health law, environmental law, and
constitutional law. 62 It is also interdisciplinary, bringing together law with
social sciences, medicine, public health, psychology, food studies, and
urban studies. 63 The significant focus on policy-as opposed to merely
positive law-within food law and policy brings the professional and
scholarly pursuit closest to the new social food movement."
Professor Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez uncovers the fundamental reason
that the food movement is not, and probably never could be, a cohesive
movement, when he reminds us that "food controversies .. . are never just
about food." 65 Like food law and policy, the food movement is really "a

59. Pollan, supra note 58, at 2-3; Stephen Carpenter, A New Higher Calling in Agriculture
Law, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 13, 22 (2013).
60. Pollan, supra note 58.
61. Linnekin & Broad Leib, supra note 55, at 584.
62. Id. at 586.
63. Id. at 586-87.
64. See id. at 589 (describing food law and policy as "unique because of the essential role
policy considerations play in the field").
65. Ernesto HerndAndez-Lopez, Sriracha Shutdown: Hot Sauce Lessons on Local Privilege
and Race, 46 SETON HALL L. REv. 189, 192 (2015).
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number of interrelated food movements... ." 66 These movements are
recognizable as: the organic movement, local food movement, slow food
movement, new food movement, 67 sustainable food movement, 68 food
sovereignty movement, 69 eat food movement," food justice movement,7 1
food revival, food democracy,7 2 farm-to-fork, snout-to-tail, 73 even (more
broadly) voluntary simplicity, 74 and no doubt others that I have neglected.
These interrelated movements are all focused on aspects of the food system
and they are, by and large, conceptually bound by their general opposition
to the mainstream food system. 7 ' But, because food is never just about
food, the pieces of the food movement are really about distinct political
goals.
A. PoliticalGoals
Politically, the food movement strives for: sustainability, equity,
access, economic development, fair labor, animal health, food security,76
human health through prevention of foodborne illness and obesity or other
diet-related illness, 7 hunger relief, environmental protection, farm security
(in terms of economic resilience), energy efficiency and conservation,7 1 and
more. Most participants in the food movement share an expectation that
"reforming or dismantling the industrial, commodity-based food system"
could help achieve these political goals.79 According to this view, the tools
for deconstruction include "reducing or eliminating agricultural subsidies,
utilizing taxes or regulations to force industrial food producers to
66. Tai, supra note 58, at 1072.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1073.
69. Allison Condra, Food Sovereignty in the United States: Supporting Local and Regional
Food Systems, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 281, 283 (2012).
70. Rebecca L. Goldberg, Administering Real Food: How the Eat-Food Movement Shouldand Should Not-Approach Government Regulation, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773, 775 (2012).
71. Adam B. Lichtenberger, Toward a Just Food Regime: Consumption, Ideology, and
Democratic Strategy, 10 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 173, 174 (2014).
72. Neil Hamilton, Food Democracy and the Future ofAmerican Values, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 9, 12, 13 (2004) [hereinafter Hamilton, Food Democracy].
73. Brad Weiss, Configuring the Authentic Value of Real Food: Farm-to-Fork Snout-to-Tail,
and Local FoodMovements, 39 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 614, 614 (2012).
74. Samuel Alexander & Simon Ussher, The Voluntary Simplicity Movement: A Multi-national
Survey Analysis in Theoretical Context, 12 J. CONSUMER CULT. 66, 66 (2012).
75. Tai, supra note 58, at 1075.
76. Ristino, supra note 56, at 21.
77. Emily Broad Leib, The Forgotten Half of Food System Reform: Using Food and
Agriculture Law to Foster Healthy FoodProduction,9 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 17, 18 (2013).
78. Tai, supra note 58, at 1077.
79. Broad Leib, supranote 77, at 19.
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internalize the costs of their negative impacts on health and the
environment, or decreasing consumer access to or demand for these
products by implementing marketing restrictions, labeling requirements, or
bans. .. ." " Others, notably food scholar Baylen Linnekin, imply
agreement with the general diagnosis, but argue that regulation is often the
cause of the symptoms; therefore, targeted deregulation of the food system,
rather than deconstruction by regulation, is the appropriate remedy. 8
Despite refrains that the food movement includes consumers, farmers, and
diverse cultural components, it is "blunt, confusing, and sometimes selfcontradictory . .. ."82 The general critique of the industrial food system and
the more immediate constructive policy proposals do in fact give the food
movement some political coherence.
B. Motivating Values
This coherence may be even tighter when explored through the
underlying social values that motivate the political and legal goals. In his
essay on food democracy, Professor Neil Hamilton helped clarify the link
between policy goals and underlying values when he wrote: "The medium
is food, but the theme is democracy. The purpose is to empower citizens to
have choices and find greater satisfaction in a food system reflecting the
democratic values we share and that underpin our society and economy." 83
The democratic values to which he refers are important, but the real action
is the clear connection between a very practical thing-food--and the laws
that surround it and the way the thing animates, or actualizes, our deeply
held values. In other words, food is uniquely important to our lives as a
physical necessity, and our approach to food is therefore both driven by,
and a signal of, our values.8 4 Perhaps today the "food movement is being
driven by deeper political, ethical, and philosophical issues," deeper values
than in the past."
I intend the term values here to reflect the standard dictionary
definition. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "values" as "the
principles or standards of a person or society, the personal or societal
80. Id.
81. BAYLEN J. LINNEKIN, BrING THE HANDS THAT FEED US: How FEWER, SMARTER LAWS
WOULD MAKE OUR FOOD SYSTEM MORE SUSTAINABLE 194-95, 198 (2016).

82. Carpenter, supranote 59, at 22.
83. Hamilton, Food Democracy, supranote 72, at 15-16.
84. Joshua Ulan Galperin et al., Eating is Not PoliticalAction, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 113, 114
(2017).
85. A.H. Kiran, Scaling Values: A Perspectivefrom Philosophy of Technology, in THE ETHICS
OF CONSUMPTION 347 (Helena Rocklinsberg & Per Sandin eds., 2013).
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judgment of what is valuable and important in life." 86 In this respect, when
I refer to social values, I mean those things that a social group holds to be
important and the foundational principles and standards by which they
determine that importance.
The range of values that motivate the food movement is wide, but
several recur, and recur with greater emphasis than others. These recurring
values can be placed into three broad categories. The first category is
decision-making, which refers to shared principles of good governance.
The second category is the nature of interactions, which refers to the way
different food system participants stand in relation to one another.88 The
third and final category is sources of knowledge, which refers to where
people locate the genesis of norms and authority for food decisionmaking. 89
1. Good Governance: Democracy, Transparency, Choice, and
Empowerment
Professor Hamilton captured the dominant decision-making values
when he authored two essays on food democracy. 90 Hamilton asks: "How
do we learn more about our food system and have confidence it serves our
values?" 91 To which he answers, in part, "[flood democracy is about
knowledge and understanding, about asking questions and getting
answers."9 2 With respect to decision-making, the diverse participants in the
food movement largely agree that decision-making should be driven by
transparency, accessible information, robust choice, and broad consumer
and producer empowerment.93 These values. overlay Hamilton's list of the
four key values of food democracy: broad engagement, diverse choices,
participation at all levels of decision-making, and accessible information. 94

86. Values, supra note 15, at 416.
87. Hamilton, FoodDemocracy, supranote 72, at 15-16.
88. Goldberg, supra note 70, at 783.
89. Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Change, Food Security, and Agribiodiversity: Toward a
Just, Resilient, and SustainableFood System, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 493,494 (2011).
90. Hamilton, Food Democracy, supra note 72, at 13; Neil D. Hamilton, FoodDemocracy I:
Revolution or Restoration, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 13, 13 (2005) [hereinafter Hamilton, Food Democracy
II]; see also Ristino, supra note 56, at 19 ("Fundamental to this movement are the democratic principles
that it embraces.").
91. Hamilton, FoodDemocracy, supranote 72, at 19.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Jd. at 21-22.
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Transparency, for example, motivates calls for labeling 95 and localization,
and production downscaling. 96 The value of robust choice internalizes the
belief that food is a dignitary issue, not just a matter of physical survival,
and that people should be able to make "autonomous decisions" about their
food.97 Decisions are autonomous if they are based on transparency, but
also if they are not restricted by limited options.98 Baylen Linnekin's work
reminds that choice is not just a matter of choosing among available
options, but of having a sufficient menu of options from which to choose. 99
Extensive choices and the information and transparency that shine light
on the available choices help support empowerment, which is the final
value in the governance category. Empowerment here simply means the
ability to behave meaningfully both in one's private decisions and the
ability to influence public arrangements. Participation and empowerment
undergird the interest in food."oo People want to know what they are eating,
they want to have free choice to eat a variety of foods, and-lest this be
only a restatement of classical liberal values-they want their actions to
have some impact on the system, that is, on public wellbeing. 101
2. Interactions: Participation, Relationships, and Dialogues
The second category of values that drive the food movement
emphasizes interactions. Food movement participants prefer a world in
which participation, relationships, and dialogues infuse and create
communities in which "personal connections, a stronger sense of
community," are priorities and are supported by the food system.1 02 To
some extent, a desire for closer connections and more participation in the
system are instrumental toward other values such as confidence and

95. See Jason Czarnezki et al., Creating Order Amidst Food Eco-Label Chaos, 25 DUKE
ENvTL. L. POL'Y F. 281, 281 (2015) ("Eco-labels also provide a basis for. . .transparency.").
96. See Kiran, supra note 85, at 348 ("That is to say, small scale production invites
transparencybetween producer and consumer.").
97. Mortazavi, supranote 41, at 952.
98. See id. at 955 (noting that food lawsuits are about individual desires to make moral choices
as consumers).
99. LINNEKIN, supra note 81, at 195.
100. Laura B. DeLind, Are Local Foods and the Local FoodMovement Taking Us Where We
Want to Go? Or Are We Hitching Our Wagons to the Wrong Stars?, 28 AGRIC. HUM. VALUES 273,
273-74 (2011).
101. But see Lichtenberger, supra note 71, at 178 (describing people generally as unwilling to
participate in politics yet paradoxically desiring leaders who make neutral policy).
102. Hamilton, Food Democracy II, supra note 90, at 41; see also, e.g., Goldberg, supra note
70, at 782 (describing the food movement); Marne Coit, Jumping on the Next Bandwagon:An Overview
of the Policy and Legal Aspects of the Local FoodMovement, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 45, 48 (2008).
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transparency,103 but the desire also stands alone as a self-justifying value.104
Marne Coit asserts that a main motivation of local food consumers is the
relationship between growers and buyers."o' This is "a deeper connection
beyond the financial one."' 0 6 It is a "face to face interaction [that] provides
a connection not available when purchasing food at a supermarket."10 7
The desire to participate in food system decision-making and
meaningful relationships among participants may stem from a recognition
that food is part of a complex ecological system; humans are no less a part
of that system than the plants and animals we eat. If anything, we are a
larger part insofar as our actions more dramatically change the system.
Social interactions, particularly as they relate to food, help us make sense of
that reality. 108 Interconnections and social processes, therefore, are
"overarching motivation[s]" 10' because they allow each of us to be a
meaningful part of the array of persons, animals, things, and the "web of
relationships" in which we live and eat. 10 Though not writing about food,
Professor Peter Bell explains that "[j]ust as persons in society have
concerns about being overcome or invaded by others, so too do we have
concerns about being isolated ... from others." "' The truth of this
sentiment is probably especially true when we eat.
Importantly, however, the mere existence of a participatory system
with closer and more diverse relationships is not the full extent of what
motivates this second category of values. It is also important that the
relationships include conversation, back-and-forth, and learning. "The core
of the new movements" argues Stephen Carpenter, is "dialectic between
farmers, consumers, and those in between."" 2
3. Sources of Knowledge: Local, Community, Traditions, and Progress
Finally, shared values about the appropriate source of knowledge
motivate the food movement."' The food movement consistently agrees
103. Phil Mount, Growing Local Food: Scale and Local FoodSystems Governance, 29 AGRIC.
HUM. VALUES 107, 109 (2012).
104.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
1177, 1205
112.
113.

JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTH{ROPOCENE 234 (2015).

Coit, supra note 102, at 49.
Id.
Id.
PURDY, supra note 104, at 230.
Weiss, supra note 73, at 615.
Goldberg, supra note 70, at 782.
Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise of Neocontract, 74 MINN. L. REV.
(1990).
Carpenter, supra note 59, at 24.
Broad Leib, supra note 77, at 33-34.

2017]

Value of Hypocrisy and Policy Sincerity

361

that the dominant sources of norms, and knowledge about how to govern
the food system, are embedded in local communities, local traditions, and
that progress should grow from those sources. 114 It is within this category of
values that reaction to the mainstream food system is most apparent."' The
modern food system is characterized (especially within the food movement)
as removed from any sense of place; a collection of industrial giants; a
commodity-based, bland behemoth supported by government subsidies,
which produces "unhealthy, overly-processed foods.""' If this system is
undesirable, it is not because of inefficiency or high prices: it is because it
does not account for social values and the traditions of local communities
because there is a disassociation between desire and opportunity. 17 The
current system imposes practices, it imposes limited relationships, and it
imposes local externalities, but it does not have room for "unique local
expressions . . . .""'Thus, across the food movement, there is demand for
"[c]ommunity [s]elf-[g]overnance" 11 and a food "system that is
appropriate for a particular community."' 2 0 Desire for localism does have
connections to concepts like food miles and the energy use of food
transportation,12 1 but at base it is motivated by a preference for sense of
place,12 2 for "place-based inquiry and innovation."l 2 3
The relationship between innovation, progress, and tradition is the final
aspect of this final category of motivating values. Despite the reticence to
accept large-scale efficiencies and the technical innovations of the last halfcentury, the food movement is indeed a progressive movement. 124 The
value of progress within the movement, however, is rooted in these local,
place-based, community foundations. 125 The food movement values
progressive traditionalism-progress that evolves from local traditions
rather than change that lurches forward, disconnected from current practice

114. Ristino, supra note 56, at 24; DeLind, supra note 100, at 274, 279-80; Condra, supra note
69, at 303; Gonzalez, supranote 89, at 494.
115. Broad Leib, supranote 77, at 31-34.
116. Id. at 19.
117. See generally Susan A. Schneider, Reconnecting Consumers and Producers: On the Path
Toward A Sustainable Food and Agriculture Policy, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIc. L. 75, 75 (2009) (describing
the current state of food production and consumption as an inadequate system that (1) is disconnected
from its consumers; and (2) fails to consider relevant cultural and societal values).
118. DeLind, supranote 100, at 274.
119. Condra, supra note 69, at 302.
120. Id. at 306.
121. Broad Leib, supranote 77, at 18.
122. DeLind, supranote 100, at 274.
123. Id. at 279.
124. Ristino, supra note 56, at 17.
125. Weiss, supranote 73, at 619.
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because of the decisions of corporate or government leaders. 126 As
Professor Laurie Ristino poetically explains, "[a] feature of humanity is that
as we push forward, we reach back seeking to anchor the soul."'2 7
The three value categories in this section are, of course, not entirely
distinct. There are relationships between the values of good governance,
interconnection, and localism. 128 In the 1940s, the USDA conducted
research that compared two California towns that were primarily
distinguished by the type of farm ownership prevalent in each.12 9 In the first
town, large-scale industrial operations owned by out-of-town interests were
dominant.'3 0 In the second town, the principal farm structure was local and
family owned. 131 Suggesting that the values of localism and decisionmaking are interrelated both philosophically and instrumentally, the USDA
research concluded that local democracy was more robust in the town with
local, family-farm ownership because where the outside agribusinesses
dominated, they could exert control over local government.13 2
To this sort of influence, Professor Ristino responds that the food
movement seeks "grounding in, and reclaiming of, community. Thus, the
legal tools that are developed should reflect this value."'33 Indeed, the legal
tools should reflect this value and the others discussed in this section. In the
two concluding sections, I argue that the common law is a tool that meets
this challenge. Importantly, if the characterization of the values of the food
movement in this section is not convincing because the reader believes the
movement is simply too diverse for such an account, the argument for a
sincerity between the common law and the food movement should still
persuade. If the food movement is intractably diverse, policy developed
through the majority-rule of Congress or the bureaucratic filtering of
administrative rulemaking is less equipped to deal with the diverse values
than the case-by-case scrutiny of common law discussed below.

126. DeLind, supra note 100, at 280.
127. Ristino, supra note 56, at 1.
128.

PEW CHARITABLE TR., PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL

PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 38, 41, 45 (2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pe
g/publications/report/pcifapfinalpdfpdf.
129. Id. at 42.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Ristino, supra note 56, at 24.
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Ill. CHARACTERIZING THE COMMON LAW

In the opening chapter of his book, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart
addresses the question: "What is law?" 134 Professor Brian Bix nicely
summarizes the answer. According to Bix, Hart's answer to the question
"[w]hat is law?" is "why do you ask?"' This section is an attempt to
answer, "what is the common law?" Why do I ask? Because I want to
understand whether the common law is an appropriate legal structure for
addressing the motivating values in food law and policy.
The simple way to characterize the common law is to define it as
judge-made law, stemming from post-Norman England, based on
community norms and practices, and practically implemented in areas such
as tort, contract, property, and to a lesser extent, criminal law.136 This
section will further elaborate this definition and describe the various
theories of the common law, trying to define the values of the common law
that are implied in these theories.
A deeper characterization of common law needs to begin with a
distinction between common law and other overarching sources of law. The
three primary sources of positive legal commands come from constitutions,
statutes (including the administrative law that emerges from statutes), and
the common law.137 A key distinction between the common law and these
other sources is the point of reference. When presented with a constitutional
or statutory question of law there is almost boundless room for different
interpretations, analysis, and application of the law to the facts, but there is
relatively easy agreement on the specific positive language that a court
must interpret, analyze, and apply.138 For instance, if a conflict revolves
around the small producer exemptions in the Food Safety Modernization
Act ("the Act"), then the starting point for legal analysis is the Act itself1 39
and the Act's implementing regulations. 140 If somebody contends that
portions of the Act create uncompensated regulatory takings because of
their economic burden on small farmers, then the starting point for legal

134. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 (3d ed. 2012).

135. Bix, supra note 25, at 6.
136. Id. at 154.
137. Origins of American Law, LUMEN, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundlesspoliticalscience/chapter/origins-of-american-law/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2017).
138. SCHEPPELE, supra note 35, at 95.
139. Food Safety Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2252 (2012).
140. E.g., Standards for Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding Produce for Human
Consumption, 21 C.F.R. §112 (2017) (providing an example of an implementing regulation for the Food
Safety Modernization Act).
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analysis is the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.141 If a
conflict arises under the common law, even settling on the binding
precedent is a respectable challenge. This is one of-perhaps the keycharacteristics that sets the common law apart from other areas of law: there
is no single, authoritative source that gives a general, interpretable rule.
There is a sea of precedent that provides support for multiple, competing
arguments. 142
It is true that much of what was once purely common law derived
exclusively from judicial opinions over centuries has now been codified in
state statutes.1 43 Codification narrows the scope of judicial interpretation,
but on the whole, it still maintains the basic common law flavor.'" While a
state legislature may have defined the elements or limited the application of
a common law tort, such as nuisance,1 45 the majority of controlling law
from defining causation to calculating damages is still typically found in the
sea of common law precedent and not in statutory language.1 4 6 Thus, the
characterization in this section includes both -strict common law and
legislative tweaks to the common law.
A. The EnvironmentalProtection Template
This endeavor-to characterize the common law for the purpose of
assessing its fit with a specific policy area-is not new.1 47 For nearly the
141. See, e.g., Joshua Ulan Galperin, Does the Compensation Clause Burden the Government or
Benefit the Owner? The Compensation Clause as Process, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 27, 27 (2011)

[hereinafter Galperin, Burden or Benefit] (explaining that the debate around the Takings Clause is
concerned with when a regulation goes too far and therefore becomes a taking such that compensation is
due); U.S. CONsT. amend. V (prohibiting the taking of private property without just compensation).
142.

SCHEPPELE, supranote 35, at 95.

143. BIx, supra note 25, at 153 n.L
144. Id.
145. For example, so-called right-to-farm laws have become common. Reagan M. Marble, The
Last Frontier: Regulating Factory Farms, 43 TEx. ENVTL. L.J. 175, 181 (2013). Such laws limit
nuisance lawsuits against agricultural operations. Id.
146. Bix, supra note 25, at 153 n.1.
147. E.g., GuDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

306 (1970) (showing how the debate progressed over using the common law to solve environmental
problems); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-90 (1972) (outlining a framework for
integrating property and torts and examining the previously ignored relationships between them); Steven
Shavell, Liabilityfor Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 357, 372 (1984) (suggesting
that some individuals view tort regulations as ineffective and inadequate while others find tort liability
to be unduly restrictive and costly); Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using
Nuisance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENvTL. L. 403, 415 (1997) (identifying three
negative characteristics of relying on nuisance in pollution contexts); Richard A. Epstein, Too
Pragmatic By Half 109 YALE L.J. 1639, 1643 (2000) [hereinafter Epstein, Too Pragmatic]
(emphasizing that the common law approach to property rights is applicable to environmental issues);
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last half century, scholars have debated whether the common law is a useful
tool for solving environmental problems. 148 That debate (if recounted
briefly enough) provides additional insight for the present effort.
Importantly, this debate and this subsection focus on tort as a subset of
the common law. There is no doubt that other common law areas such as
property and contract are relevant to environmental protection. 149 Even
criminal law has a role to play.150 But, tort has dominated the debate, and I
continue that focus here because it is more precise to delve into the
specifics of a narrower area and because a burning controversy is always
more interesting.
The dominant environmental law narrative is that environmental
protection began with the common law,1 s' but the realities of environmental
problems and the constraints of the common law were simply too great,
necessitating the age of statutes in which environmental law now lives. 152
This simple narrative suggests that food law and policy has little to learn
from the environmental experience because food law and agriculture law,
Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in Translation: What EnvironmentalRegulation Does that Tort Cannot
Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 587 (2002) [hereinafter Schroeder, Lost in Translation] (describing
a process for assessing the consequences of relying on torts in the environmental context by ascertaining
the goals of tort in general); Peter Cane, Using Tort Law to Enforce Environmental Regulations?, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 427, 429 (2002) (stating that some argue for the use of common law in the
environmental regulation context while others advocate for a complete abandonment of tort law in this
sector); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulation and Litigation: Complementary Tools for Environmental
Protection, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 371, 372-73 (2005) [hereinafter McGarity, Regulation and
Litigation] (criticizing tort reform and highlighting the importance of enforcing environmental statutes
with "vigorous" tort litigation); Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy Instrument,
92 OR. L. REV. 381, 400 (2014) (positing that tort law is an imperfect environmental policy tool).
148. CALABRESI, supranote 147, at 296, 306.
149. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY
INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 47, 77, 80, 83, 288-89 (Eric W. Orts & Kurt

Deketelaere eds., 2001) (discussing how civil law areas relate to environmental protection); James E.
Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 325 (1992)
(demonstrating that property and contracts are relevant to environmental protection). In one sense,
property law as a tool for environmental law does not really stand on its own because robust tort actions,
such as trespass and nuisance, must be available to defend common law property rights.
150. See generally Cane, supra note 147, at 428 (noting the relevance of criminal law
deterrence, strict liability, responsibility, and risk assessment in an environmental context).
151.

See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,

AND POLICY 63 (7th ed. 2013) ("Prior to the explosion of environmental legislation in the 1970s, the
common law was the legal system's primary vehicle for responding to environmental problems.").
152. See, e.g., id. ("After centuries of wrestling with environmental conflicts, the common law
now has been supplemented, and in some cases supplanted, by regulatory statues . . . ."); Richard A.
Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection: How the Modern EnvironmentalMovement
Has Lost Its Way, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 143 (2016) [hereinafter Epstein, Environmental
Protection] (asserting that "most people" believe strong state and federal administrative agencies are
necessary for environmental protection "even though these were not in evidence in the United States
until 1970").
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the forebears of food law and policy, 153 essentially began as statutory
creations, 5 4 while environmental law began in the common law.'s There is
no doubt that this inversion leads to some stark difference. But the deeper
questions, those questions that get at Hart's "why do you ask?," 5 6 are
enlightening and provide a helpful template for characterizing the common
law.
Scholars who explore the intersection of the common law and the
environment use two basic approaches. One approach seeks to uncover the
fundamental purpose of tort, thereby evaluating the jurisprudential fit
between environmental degradation as a problem and tort as a theoretical
solution."' The other approach looks at the practicalities of tort and the
characteristics of environmental problems to gauge whether tort actions can
effectively and practically resolve environmental problems."'
1. Fundamental Purposes
Of course, those scholars who inquire about the purpose of tort do not
agree on that purpose.' 59 One school of thought argues that tort essentially
serves a utilitarian public policy goal, to maximize public welfare. 160 The
other school argues that tort is essentially an area of private law (more
analogous to other common law fields such as contract and property),
which assures that when one person harms another there is a forum for
civilized confrontation, adjudication, and ultimately compensation. 16 1

153: Linnekin & Broad Leib, supranote 55, at 559.
154. See Hutt, supra note 32, at 47 (describing federal legislation beginning prior to 1906 and
the 1906 passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act).
155.

PERCIVALET AL., supra note 151, at 63.

156. Bix, supra note 25, at 6.
157. E.g., Schroeder, Lost in Translation, supra note 147, at 587 (explaining how "to assess the
environmental consequences" of tort law).
158. E.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Public Law versus PrivateLaw in EnvironmentalRegulation:
European Union Proposals in the Light of United States Experience, 4 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L.
ENVTL. L. 312, 317 (1995) (declaring tort law "inadequate to deal effectively with environmental [law]
problems").
159. Schroeder, Lost in Translation, supra note 147, at 587 ("The objectives of tort are the
subject of a long-running debate that shows no signs of resolving itself any time soon.").
160. BIx, supra note 25, at 266-67; see also CALABRESI, supra note 148, at 86-88 (discussing
welfare economics); Keith Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for
EnvironmentalRegulation, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 673, 674-75 (2008) [hereinafter Hylton, Economic
Theory] (describing an economic theory of nuisance, which accounts for the benefits of decentralizing
environmental regulation and relying on tort law).
161. BIX, supra note 25, at 268-69; see also Cane, supra note 147, at 429 (taking the position
that the purpose of tort law is to justify requirements for restitution).
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The public policy view of tort law has dominated for the past half
century. 162 This approach asserts that tort must be understood through an
economic lens, and that tort must be judged by its ability to efficiently
distribute limited resources. 163 Tort can facilitate efficient distribution of
resources because through damage awards, the law can quantify the cost of
risk-taking. 164 All members of society take risks, and those risks can result
in accidents.16' According to this view, the law should not discourage all
risk-taking, but it should offer price signals. Risk-takers can balance the
benefit of taking a risk-for example, the benefit of using a new food
processing technique or marketing strategy-against the costs of taking the
risk-for example, occasional injuries that might arise from the new
process or harms that stem from potentially misleading advertising. When a
court awards damages, those damages send a price signal to other risktakers, deterring them from taking unreasonable risk, but allowing them to
judge what is reasonable based on their own economic calculations. 166 Of
course, either party could calculate the cost of taking risks. One party
calculates the risk of a new product; the other calculates the risk of using
that product. The law and economics approach tells judges to place the
burden and the damages on the party with the most information and who is
most able to make a reasoned economic decision about reducing risk. 167
This is the "cheapest cost avoider." 1 68 Judges, therefore, must analyze a
given conflict in such a way as to "prevent[] those harms whose costs of
precaution are less than the anticipated cost of harm." 1 69
One of the defining characteristics of the economic view is that
individual decisions in individual conflicts aggregate into broader public
signals, influence private behavior, and therefore have a distinct public

&

162. See Abelkop, supra note 147, at 392 ("The dominant position, however, seems to be the
instrumentalist view, which emphasizes the general deterrent effects of liability as public law."); see
also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 147 (analyzing the use of criminal sanctions in the context of
pollution as nuisance); Shavell, supra note 147, at 372 (outlining the shortcomings of regulation in
assigning liability for toxic waste); Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and the
New Enforcement Actions, 18 SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 43, 44 (2010) [hereinafter Hylton, Public Nuisance]
(asserting that nuisance law effectively encourages people to choose socially responsible actions when
liability exceeds benefits).
163. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 147, at 1096-97; Daniel A. Farber, The Story of
Boomer: Pollutionand the Common Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 37 (Richard J. Lazarus
Oliver A. Hauk eds., 2005).
164. CALABREsi, supranote 147, at 18, 21; Hylton, Economic Theory, supra note 160 at 673.
165. CALABRESI, supranote 147, at 17.
166. Schroeder, Lost in Translation,supranote 147, at 587.
167. Mortazavi, supranote 41, at 935.
168. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972).
169. Schroeder, Lost in Translation,supranote 147, at 587.
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policy impact.' Another important quality is that the utilitarian approach
is nominally value neutral."' While environmental statutes explicitly seek
to solve specific substantive problems and environmental harms, the law
and economics approach does not distinguish environmental damage from,
for example, a car accident or slip-and-fall. 7 2 In this view, risk-taking of
any nature has its costs and benefits, and tort should not treat environmental
harms as inherent wrongs. Rather, environmental harms are neutral, and
only wrong if their benefits do not outweigh their costs."' For that matter,
no act is inherently wrong; it is merely efficient or inefficient.
The alternative private conceptions of tort do assign value to individual
accidents distinct from their public policy impacts. 17 Private justice
theories fall into two categories-restorative justice and civic recourseboth of which rely on social expectations rather than economic outcomes."'
These theories treat tort as "a responsibility-based mechanism" 176 that
focuses its analysis on "rights and obligations," such that "the function of
tort law is to protect rights and to enforce obligations.""'
Restorative justice is the older of these private views of tort, and it was
the dominant view prior to the emergence of the utilitarian model.
Restorative justice enforces duties, responsibilities, and obligations by
imposing damages.1 7 9 It stresses that the purpose of tort is to restore an
injured party, when the defendant wronged that party, regardless of price
signals or efficient distribution of resources." The civic recourse theory
agrees that norm-based interpersonal responsibilities animate tort law, but
that compensation is not the critical tool for enforcing these
responsibilities."' Instead of compensation and restoration, civic recourse
stresses the process of confrontation, of calling on alleged wrongdoers to
account for their actions as a means of empowering individuals in a broader
170. Hylton, Economic Theory, supra note 160, at 673.
171. See, e.g., Epstein, Too Pragmatic,supra note 147, at 1643 (arguing that statutory law is a
form of special pleading for the environment because statutes explicitly elevate environmental
protection over competing societal interests, while the common law is neutral as among various social
values).
172. Id.
173. See Mortazavi, supra note 41, at 934-35 (noting that reasonable harm is discerned by
balancing the cost of prevention against the cost of a remedy).
174. Id. at 934.
175. Cane, supra note 147, at 429.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 430.
178. Schroeder, Lost in Translation,supra note 147, at 587.
179. Id. at 590.
180. Cane, supra note 147, at 429.
181. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L.
REv. 364, 406 (2005).
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society. 182 Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky, leading
advocates of civic recourse theory, write that the tort process "affirms the
notion that each of us is equal in owing and being owed various obligations
by others," and the nature of tort adjudication both provides the forum for
realizing social obligations and must operate with this responsibility in
mind. 1'

Tort could be viewed as a public policy tool that assures efficient use
of resources, a private ordering tool that offers compensation for
wrongdoing, or a forum for expressing individual equality under the law. It
is not essential to commit to any of these first principles of tort. In fact, a
pragmatic approach to the law insists that we do not demand a single
theory, but rather that we see the value of either conception and can call on
either depending on the relevant social goal.184 The next section of this
Article will argue that having both a public policy and classically liberal
justification makes the common law particularly well suited as an
instrument for food law and policy. But, it is also not necessary to commit
to either of these philosophies because, in practice, tort still has relevant
qualities whether or not it is tethered to some unalterable and universal
justification.
2. Practical Purposes
In the environmental space, those scholars who eschew fundamentalist
inquiry instead explore both the practical limitations and benefits of tort as
an environmental protection tool. 1' Among the limitations are:
(1) concerns about the long-term nature of environmental problems getting
appropriate attention in a common law court that looks at short-term
problems;' 86 (2) the diffuse nature of environmental harms, which makes
appropriate defendants hard to identify; "' (3) the challenge of proving
causation when environmental harms have uniquely complex pathways;' 88
and (4) the lack of expertise among common law judges.' On the other
hand, the common law can offer benefits, which include: (1) avoiding some

182. Id.
183. Id. at 369.
184. Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me, I'm A Pragmatist:A Partially Pragmatic Critique of
PragmaticActivism, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 425, 436-37 (2017) [hereinafter Galperin, Trust Me].
185. Schroeder, Lost in Translation,supra note 147, at 587.
186. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and EnvironmentalRegulation:
An Analytical Overview, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 380 (2002).
187. Id. at 386.
188. Schroeder, Lost in Translation,supra note 147, at 592.
189. Heimert, supranote 147, at 415.
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of the inefficiencies of regulation, such as the agency-cost problem; 190
(2) limiting the impact of rent-seeking politics, agency capture, and
immense wealth disparities;1 91 and (3) providing opportunities to uncover
valuable information through discovery.' 92 There is certainly some food and
environmental overlap within these considerations, but there are some more
general and meaningful characteristics within tort, and the common law at
large, that are more relevant for food law and policy.
B. Defining Characteristicsof the Common Law
One defining characteristic of the common law is its process, a process
that is "a form of common or collective reasoning, or a common or
collective form of moral intuition." 93 Common law decision-making is
case by case, which necessarily makes common law progress incremental,
rather than transformative as legislative or administrative fiat can
be.' 9 4 The characteristic that is most responsible for the incrementalism of
the common law is stare decisis, which directs that each judicial decision
should be consistent with earlier decisions.195 Professor Bix pulls these
threads together to define common law by its four central elements:
(1) incremental development; (2) by judges; (3) case by case; and (4) with
consistency among decisions.' 96 According to Bix, these features make use
of "moral intuition, hierarchical discipline, and principled consistency." 97
In this way, "common law reasoning seems to reflect at a more public level
the way people develop their own moral principles and views on life." 98 If
Professor Bix is correct in this assessment, one might describe the common
law as a formal legal process for reflecting human nature.
1. Community Norms
Other scholars have also focused on the way that the common law
process formalizes, but essentially captures, norms of communal decisionmaking. Professor Gerald Postema explains that common law originated as
190. Hylton, PublicNuisance, supra note 162, at 676.
191. See McGarity, Regulation and Litigation, supra note 147, at 373 (2005) (stating that tort
litigation provides benefits of predictability, control, efficiency, and fairness in the context of
environmental litigation).
192. Id. at 396; Abelkop, supra note 147, at 393.
193. BIx, supra note 25, at 153.
194. Id
195. Id. at 155.
196. Id at 154.
197. Id
198. Id. at 157.
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"a public process of reasoning in which practical problems of daily social
life were addressed. 'Custom' and 'reason' were the twin foci of this
conception of law."l 99 But Professor Postema notes "[c]ommon law, and
widely shared conceptualizations of it, may have been (and may continue to
be) considerably more complex than our common knowledge admits." 200
Widely shared conceptions of common law presume judges are the arbiters
of custom and reason, and that common law is simply judge-made law.201
Postema cautions that, in fact, the way in which the law is "taken up" is
actually rooted more in community acceptance.20 2 A judicial pronunciation
does not effectively become common law unless it is rooted in a nation's
"basic normative structure . . . ."203
In a different context, Douglas Edlin makes essentially the same
argument that common law is not just judge-made law, because law is
necessarily tied to its community.204 Professor Edlin studied the way in
which we superficially demand judicial objectivity, but-in fact-expect
and cannot avoid intersubjectivity. 205 "Intersubjectivity means that the
judge decides as an individual within a larger community, that the judge
produces judgments with the understanding that they must contain
statements of justificatory reasons for legal conclusions, and that these
conclusions depend on their evaluation and validation by the community as
legal judgments."2 06 Edlin has two key points. First, that objectivity has
little meaning in the law since it is wrong to speak of true or false legal
decisions.207 Second, a universally objective argument necessarily ignores
the local nuances of community expectations.2 08 Identity of the judge and
the community are both important.209
2. Progressive Traditionalism
Community identities and norms, however, are not fixed. Just as these
practices and expectations change over time, so too does the common law,
199. Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588,

200.
201.
202.
203.

590 (Jules L. Coleman et al. eds., 2002).

Id. at 589.
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id.

204. DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, COMMON LAW JUDGING: SUBJECTIVITY, IMPARTIALITY, AND THE
MAKING OF LAW 5-6 (2016).

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See generally id. (discussing objectivity in law and subjectivity in judging).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9.
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which, no matter how longstanding, is always open to re-evaluation.2 10 The
form of common law adjustment might be called progressive traditionalism
in that it is incremental, based on past precedents, but seeking to resolve
new problems and adapt to new circumstances as necessary. 211 It is
traditionalism because the common law looks backward at precedent and at
norms in an effort to be continuous. 212 It is progressive because it is
adaptive, and because the common law not only reflects norms, but also
shapes norms. 213 Common law rules "are refined over time, softened to fit
the contours of the community's daily life. Simultaneously, following the
rules and practices [of the common law] shapes the dispositions, beliefs,
and expectations of the people."2 14
The common law's flexibility, especially with regard to new scientific
information, also lies within the ideal of progressive traditionalism. 215
Where legislative decision-making can freely ignore scientific input, and
administrative decision-making can set extraordinarily high (political)
standards for acting on new scientific inputs, the common law has a more
flexible process for integrating and acting on scientific knowledge. 216 This
flexibility adds to the growth of common law and its responsiveness to
changing local and global circumstances.
Common law, as practiced, can be aggressive, confrontational,
technical, burdensome, and shadowed by jargon and maxims, but according
to Christopher St. German, maxims are "rooted in a shared sense
of.. . reasonableness." 2 17 In other words, custom is a source of common
law's validity, but it is not the same thing as common law because common
law is a reflexive institution.
3. Collaborative Decision-making
Common law shifts, progresses, and reformulates-in agricultural
terms, it breeds, grows, and evolves-through a structure for deliberative

210. Id. at 66.
211. See Postema, supra note 199, at 591 (describing the common law as being both progressive
and continuous at the same time).
212. Id.
213. Id at 592.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 43 (discussing the
changes in common law in the context of expert witness testimony as a reaction to developments in the
scientific community).
216. Id at 43, 89-90.
217. Postema, supra note 199, at 592.
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reasoning and argument.2 18 The discursive process allows participants to
present their arguments for both interpreting existing norms and
recognizing changing norms. 2 19 Thus, even while the common law can
create "strikingly adversarial relationships," 220 it is also "essentially
collaborative: it is a practice of thinking, arguing, deliberating, and
deciding in common." 22 ' This is to say that while the common law may
seem like an ancient or burdensome legal quagmire, it is validated and
shaped by both subtle norms and direct and intentional community
engagement.222 To frame this relationship slightly differently, the common
law is a concept, but it is also a real framework for engagement, and that
framework "provides a public focus, forum, and exemplar for a practice
with the potential for wide participation in society." 223 It is a
"methodological thesis . . not an ontological point about the ultimate order
of being." 224 The framework "offers ordinary practical reasoning a multilayered, practi[c]ed discipline of deliberating and reasoning together
regarding public matters."2 25
With a sense of the common law as a legal instrument and an
expression of what makes law valid, it is possible to consider whether the
common law is a suitable structure for food law and policy. As the first
section of this Article argues, this inquiry certainly demands consideration
of whether the common law will be effective at achieving the political goals
of the food movement. But it also suggests that a non-instrumentalist
assessment of the policy sincerity-the match between the values that
motivate the common law and the food movement-will help determine the
fit between the common law and the food movement. The next section
pursues both lines of inquiry.
IV. COMMON LAW FOOD POLICY?

This is not the first article to consider the importance of the common
law as a component of food policy. It is, however, one of only a very few.
Through this section, it is also the first article to argue that the common law
can serve the interest of policy sincerity--of fitting the values of a legal
tool with the values that motivate a movement's goals. To set the stage, this
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id at 594.
Id
Bell, supra note 111, at 1207 n.1 10.
Postema, supra note 199, at 603.
Id. at 602-43.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 602.
Id.
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section begins by looking at two recent articles that consider the common
law as a strategic tool for food policy. It builds on this existing analysis by
comparing the values that motivate the food movement with the values that
are embedded in the common law, concluding that there is a strong fit, and,
therefore, satisfying policy sincerity.
A. Tai andMortazavi on Flexibilityand Democracy
Because it is a young endeavor, and probably because it is also so
diverse, the food movement is still searching for a strong set of legal and
policy tools. 22 6 This Article argues that common law tools are well suited
for advancing food policy and this conclusion grows from earlier work by
Professors Stephanie Tai and Melissa Mortazavi, both who have
convincingly argued for more consideration of tort actions.22 7 Professor
Tai, among other things, demonstrates that common law litigation is
relatively more effective at furthering the political goals of the food
movement than administrative litigation, in large part because of the
flexibility of the common law. 228 Professor Mortazavi reiterates this point
and adds an important additional benefit: tort litigation supports
deliberative democracy, which serves a legitimating function, thereby also
improving food policy. 2 29 Although both analyses look to the instrumental
value of common law litigation, they argue that even in losing a lawsuit, the
litigation process can benefit the development of sound food policy. 230 This
complementary reasoning is at once strategically useful for the food
movement and conceptually directive for the idea of the common law as
sincere policy within the food movement.
Tai begins her article, The Rise of US. Food SustainabilityLitigation,
by reviewing the nature of the "growing interest in the United States
regarding the sustainability of food."23 ' This review considers whether there
is such a thing as a food movement,232 the putative movement's immediate
policy goals, 233 and its loftier "aspirational features." 234 Professor Tai
concludes that "[t]he interest in sustainable food appears to fulfill all of
226. Tai, supra note 58, at 1074.
227. Mortazavi, supra note 41 at 931.
228. Tai, supranote 58, at 1117.
229. Mortazavi, supra note 41, at 931.
230. Tai, supra note 58, at 1073.
231. Id. at 1074.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1076 (noting that environmental protection, reduced pesticide and fertilizer use, farm
security, hunger relief, and advocacy for local food systems are among the policy goals of the food
movement).
234. Id. at 1079.
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the[] descriptions of social movements." 235 The movement generally
"draws . . . its force from opposition to" the industrialized food system.236
From this opposition, it pursues environmental and small farm security
policies, and to a lesser degree "hunger relief." 23 7 In its more constructive
moments, the movement also supports policies that work to reduce
pesticide and fertilizer use or to advocate for local food systems.2 38
Tai also turns to sociological research for "a deeper inquiry into the
values embodied in this movement," because these values can provide "a
more insightful legal analysis." 239 For this, Professor Tai refers to the
research of Jack Kloppenburg, who studied "what food activists are
contemplating when they discuss food sustainability."240 Tai reports that the
"aspirational features" of those who are active in food sustainability
include: ecological sustainability, knowledge availability, proximity of food
to the consumer, economic sustainability, individual participation in the
food system, justice of the system, regulations to foster environmental and
social values, cultural and spiritual wellbeing, and food as cultural
expression. 241 This list is specifically focused just on the term sustainability
as applied to food, but nevertheless gives a sense of motivating aspirations.
It likewise provides a useful baseline for assessing whether any policy
instrument actually achieves what it is meant to achieve.
To determine whether litigation has been a useful tool for furthering
food sustainability goals, Tai narrows in on two ripe areas of conflict:
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) and genetically modified
organisms (GMOs). 242 The movement targets CAFOs because of their
mistreatment of animals, enormous size in comparison to other methods for
raising poultry and livestock, use of antibiotics, environmental impacts,
ownership structure, and impacts on local quality of life.243 The movement
began to target GMOs because of concerns about transgenic migration,
pesticide resistance and overuse, food adulteration, and biodiversity loss. 24 4
The bulk of Professor Tai's study surveys specific lawsuits brought
against CAFO and GMO defendants.24 5 In both cases, the vast majority of

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 1076.
Id.
Id. at 1078-79.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1079-80.
Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1089-90.
Id. at 1080.
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litigation involves regulatory and administrative processes. 246 CAFO
litigation has emerged from the Clean Water Act, 24 7 Clean Air Act, 24 8
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act, 249 the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 25 0

state regulation, and to a lesser extent, common law. 251 GMO litigation has
been narrower, typically using the National Environmental Policy Act 2 52 to
challenge federal agency approvals of GMOs.253 In this case, common law
has not played a role.2 54
Professor Tai concludes that common law suits, particularly nuisance
suits, have been relatively more successful in the ongoing fight against
CAFOs than much of the regulatory litigation.2 55 She points to success both
in legal victorieS 256 and in advancing values, even in defeat. 25 7 One case in
particular stands out as a partial legal victory with a decisive moral
component.
Wendinger v. Forst Farms arose out of a conflict between Julia and
Gerald Wendinger-landowners in Nicollet County, Minnesota-and their
neighbors, the Forsts. 258 In 1994, the Forsts contracted with Wakefield Pork
to transition their operation into a pork CAFO. 259 Over the years, the smells
from the CAFO became increasingly difficult for the Wendingers to bear.
After personal and state-level administrative complaints, the Wendingers
filed a suit in 2001 claiming nuisance, negligence, and trespass. 2 60 The trial
court ruled against the Wendingers, finding, inter alia, that trespass requires
a physical invasion, and odor is not physical; 26 1 that nuisance requires a
wrongful act, and operating a CAFO, even if it causes damages, is not
wrongful,2 62 and that a farm operating under "generally accepted
agricultural practices," has an affirmative defense against nuisance
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
mentioning
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 1101, 1122.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2012).
Id §§ 9601-75.
Id. §§ 11001-50.
Tai, supra note 58, at 1101.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (2012).
Tai, supra note 58, at 1122.
See id. (explaining that most GMO challenges have been under federal statutes and not
any common law theories).
Id. at 1117.
Id
Id. at 1078.
Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
Id.
Id
Id. at 550.
Id. at 551.
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claims.2 63 With respect to their trespass claim, the Court of Appeals agreed
with the trial court and ruled against the Wendingers.2 64 However, the Court
of Appeals breathed life into the Wendingers' suit with respect to the
nuisance and negligence claims. That Court of Appeals ruled, first, that
while nuisance requires a harmful act, that act need not be unlawful or
negligent.265 Thus, even though a CAFO is permitted and lawfully operated,
it is still subject to nuisance challenges.266 Second, and more interestingly,
according to Professor Tai,26 7 the Court of Appeals ruled that compliance
with generally accepted agricultural practices does not provide an
affirmative defense against nuisance.26 8
Like many states, the Minnesota legislature, through a right-to-farm
statute, has limited common law claims against agricultural businesses. 2 6 9
Part of Minnesota's right-to-farm statute defines "[g]enerally accepted
agricultural practices" as those agricultural businesses operating within an
agricultural zone. 2 70 According to the court, this provision is merely a
definition and not an affirmative defense against nuisance claims.271 With
respect to the negligence claim, the Court of Appeals held that generally
acceptable agricultural practices are merely a statutory floor; even if the
Forsts' CAFO operated within these standard practices, it could still be
liable in negligence.272 The Court of Appeals therefore remanded the case
to the trial court.273
Professor Tai emphasizes the effects of this decision beyond the simple
legal victory. She writes that the decision "may have also advanced the
movement's desire to distinguish CAFOs from traditional farming
practices, and perhaps even of preserving traditional farming practices."274
This distinction and preservation is the result of the court "holding that
generally acceptable agricultural practices did not act as a shield against a

263. Id. at 553.
264. Id. at 550-51.
265. Id. at 551-52.
266. Id. at 551-53.
267. See Tai, supra note 58, at 1118 ("Beyond the environmental protection values of the
sustainable food movement, the lawsuit may have also advanced the movement's desire to distinguish
CAFOs from traditional farming practices .....
268. Wendinger, 662 N.W.2d at 553.
269. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19 (West 2017).
270. Id.
271. Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
272. Id. at 554.
273. Id at 555.
274. Tai, supra note 58, at 1118.
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negligence claim," and thus "CAFOs can be held accountable for their
effects apart from their status as farms."27 5
The focus on this decision is appropriate. Though I would argue that
the reason it deserves focus is slightly different. The Wendinger decision
reflects more on the nature of the common law than on the distinction
between CAFOs and more traditional farms. The court, notably, did not
make a determination that CAFOs-through their size, operations,
corporate structure, or other unique aspects-are fundamentally distinct
from smaller, family-owned, traditional farming.27 6 Rather, the Court of
Appeals refused, as a matter of the common law, to treat generally accepted
agricultural practices as a dispositive affirmative defense to nuisance.277
The court found that those generally accepted practices, as a statutory
baseline, do not create a standard of care in negligence. 278 The standard of
care remains a creature of the common law: always open to change,
reflecting community norms and expectations, and subject to the communal
process of common law litigation. 27 9 Thus, perhaps the significance of the
Wendinger case is not just in its signaling about CAFOs, but in its signaling
about the resilience of the common law.
This general point about the nature of the common law is not lost on
Professor Tai. As she tries to understand why common law litigation seems
to be a more fruitful tool for food policy than administrative regulation, Tai
considers some of these inherent features. 28 0 "One possible explanation for
the relative success of common law challenges compared to those brought
under state CAFO permitting laws" says Professor Tai, "may be the
somewhat greater openness of the common law for introduction of broader
concerns regarding residents' quality of life and industrialization of meat
production as opposed to the context of the more constrained state CAFO
permitting requirements." 281 Permitting, or another statutory-based
challenge, forces plaintiffs to structure their grievances to fit within a
predetermined and often unyielding conception of what is wrong. 282
Although common law theories of liability are consciously bound to
traditional causes of action, they typically allow for flexibility and value
275. Id.
276. See Wendinger, 662 N.W.2d at 554 ("We therefore conclude that the district court erred as
a matter of law in dismissing the Wendingers' claim without determining whether it alleged a legally
sufficient cause of action in negligence.").
277. Id. at 553-54.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 554.
280. Tai, supra note 58, at 1120.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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signaling in a much more vital way. 283 As Professor Tai notes, when
participants in the food movement are forced to reshape or constrict their
complaints to fit statutory demands, it may be a "threat[] to their own
identity ... ."8
The common law, on the other hand, can be an opportunity to exercise
identity and legitimize progressive food policy. This is where Professor
Mortazavi's work, Tort as Democracy: Lessons from the Food Wars,2 8 5
joins the narrative. While Professor Tai's basic assertion is that common
law litigation is an effective tool for furthering the interests of the food
movement, Professor Mortazavi's basic argument is that common law torts
play a larger societal role in which food policy benefits because food is
uniquely situated within society.286
Professor Mortazavi contextualizes her argument that tort is a critical
piece of deliberative democracy by recounting the views of tort as "risk
management" or "corrective justice." 287 Because I describe these positions
in Section IV, I will only reiterate Mortazavi's point that the risk
management perspective sees tort as a value-neutral mechanism that
facilitates economic efficiency, while a corrective justice position describes
tort as serving "an important moral function beyond loss of compensation
and efficient allocation." 288 Professor Mortazavi adds the concept of
deliberative democracy to these two standards of tort justification. This
addition is "[a]nchored
in conceptions of accountability and

discussion-. . . ."289
"[D]eliberative democratic theory asserts that legitimate political order
rests on 'publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly justifying
public policy."' 290 Professor Mortazavi summarizes a body of research that
stresses the legitimizing benefits of communication, debate, deliberation,
and responsiveness.29 1 In addition to the substantive call for more, and more
reasoned discourse, there is also "[a] procedural approach to a deliberative
democratic model [that] seeks to cultivate venues for selecting and
developing policies. More venues for public input and the input of ideas

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id. at 1121.
Mortazavi, supra note 41, at 951.
Id. at 975.
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increases democratic deliberation." 29 2 Mortazavi, a tort scholar, sees the
features of tort that fit easily with this theory.29 3
"[T]ort litigation," contends Professor Mortazavi, "is one such
additional venue for increasing the amount of discussion and attendant
responsiveness. It is through the use of this venue (tort) as an additional
channel of input that American society and laws themselves can increase
accountability, legitimacy, and potentially reach better policy decisions."2 94
Specifically, tort facilitates greater deliberative democracy because its
touchstone is social reasonableness. Tort provides a forum for civil society
to hear arguments. Tort is flexible and open. 295 Tort holds parties
"accountable by virtue of having to appear in court or dignify a pleading
with a response." 296 As Professor Tai also explained, tort is available,
perhaps the most available instrument for greater engagement in food
policy, because tort is, "by design and history, relatively fluid and
potentially tempered by equity considerations."297
In addition to these inherent characteristics, tort, as a common law
process, also has specific benefits when compared to the administrative
process. 298 Professor Mortazavi reminds that the "administrative state is
exceedingly complex," which necessarily limits, or complicates, public
participation. 299 Statutory language and agency discretion dictate the
administrative process.3 00 "[A]gency rulemaking dictates the subject matter
of debate, whereas in a tort suit, the plaintiffs complaint sets the
agenda."301 And not to be overlooked, the real politics of administrative
decision-making-the real influence and debates-"increasingly occur
outside of the official public process." 302 In comparison to the
administrative alternative, tort provides accountability, both monetary and
procedural; individual citizens can initiate it; and it is fact specific.303
The modern food movement, according to Professor Mortazavi,
recognizes that food law and policy goes beyond, for example, food safety
to encompass important discursive issues about culture and individuality,
and that common law litigation and deliberative democracy are part of a
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 937.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938.
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supportive feedback loop with food. 304 Thus, the specific causes of action
that recur are negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation
(fraud), nuisance, and product liability. 305 But these actions are used to
advance new conversations about food-related liability. The three major
areas of food discourse that are "pushing the development of food law and
policy towards new conceptions of the role of food in American society and
in the lives of individuals" are: (1) the long-term, as opposed to incidental
and accidental, health impacts from food, that is, the impacts from
recurring consumption patterns;3 06 (2) overcoming the myopic view of
food as merely a final edible product rather than the deliverable of a social
and environmental process;... and (3) claiming food as more than nutrition,
but also a meaningful part of cultural, religious, and political identity."'
Central to Professor Mortazavi's analysis is a review of tort litigation
that fits into each of these new areas of food discourse. 309 Suits over obesity
at the very beginning of the century, and health-related labeling more
recently, demonstrate a growing demand that courts and society engage
with the notion that food can cause long term damages. 3 10 "The idea that
individuals are responsible for those long-term harms, such as obesity and
various other health issues, is competing against arguments that such
choices are undermined by corporate actors who obscure meaningful
consumer choices by creating information deficiencies or exploiting
differences in bargaining power.""
Like Professor Tai, Mortazavi focuses on CAFOs and GMOs to make
out her point about the process-over-product view of food.3 12 Mortazavi
details cases alleging harm from food production, including negligence and
nuisance suits over CAFOs,3 13 and on misrepresentation around GMO food
products.314 The GMO cases do not primarily argue any food safety claims,
but instead "take the view that consumers have a right to know if GMO
products are in their food so that they can make informed choices about
what type of foods and food systems they are supporting."31
304. See id. at 938-39 ("[Much of the current food litigation ... [pushes] the development of
food law and policy towards new conceptions of the role of food in American society .....
305. Id. at 939.
306. Id.
307. Id at 945.
308. Id. at 951.
309. Id at 943.
310. Id. at 944
311. Id.
312. Id. at 946.
313. Id. at 947-48.
314. Id. at 949.
315. Id. at 950.
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Wendinger 31 6 also makes an appearance in Professor Mortazavi's
analysis. 317 Although Mortazavi describes the legal issues at play, she uses
the case to support one of her subtler points, that CAFO litigation can "do
more than protect people or the environment from exposure to physical
harm" and it can also "support a view that traditional, smaller scale farming
plays a vital role in food production." 318 The Wendinger court does not
consider relative farm size in its legal analysis, and it only briefly touches
on the nature of the Wendingers' property as a farm, never mentioning the
size or farming technique. 319 Nonetheless, Professor Mortazavi's point is
correct because the ability of an individual, who is (or was at one time) a
small-farm owner, 32 0 to engage with and at least partially prevail over a
larger operation and its corporate partner, 3 2 1 demonstrates that tort can be a
meaningful venue for food-policy discourse.
The final category of new food policy conversations is food as identity.
Here, Professor Mortazavi again points to misrepresentation claims as tools
for "vindicat[ing] dignitary rights and protect[ing] the ability to make
informed, autonomous decisions.
Cases in this category include suits by
those with religion-based dietary restrictions, other restrictions such as
vegetarianism, or raw-food diets.3 2 3 There is a case in which a woman who
follows Muslim restrictions on pork consumption sued a vitamin
manufacturer that claimed its pills were pork free when in fact they used
pork-based gelatin.324 Consumers also sued McDonald's for selling nonvegetarian French fries. 325 These cases have had mixed results, but they
provide a deliberative benefit as they "tease out in more detail the religious
identity" or raise
and moral implications of food consumption for32 personal
6
"concerni[s] predominately as a liberty interest."

.

316. I do not mean for my attention to Wendinger to suggest that this case is a paragon of food
policy litigation. Although it is a perfectly useful example of a number of legal issues within food law, it
has not yet had any especially impressive influence on the field. According to a 2017 Westlaw search,
other courts have cited to it 18 times, and 12 law review articles have also cited to it The case is
interesting because both Tai and Mortazavi gave it attention and cited to it for advancing larger issues in
food law and policy.
317. Mortazavi, supra note 41, at 948.
318. Id.
319. See generally Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(discussing the way the Forsts' used their land for farming).
320. See id. at 549 ("Gerald Wendinger was born on and farmed the Wendinger land until the
1970s.").
321. See id. ("In 1994, the Forsts entered into an agreement with Wakefield Pork. .
322. Mortazavi, supra note 41, at 952.
323. Id. at 952-54.
324. Id. at 952-53.
325. Id. at 954.
326. Id. at952.
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Tort as Democracy concludes with two points about the indirect
benefits of tort's democratic function. First, Professor Mortazavi shows
how tort claims can be "an adversary and companion to the regulatory
state," because "[t]ort and the administrative state have long coexisted in a
mutually reinforcing dialectic-where one system moves and the other
system often reacts." 327 By way of example, Mortazavi identifies legislative
actions, such as mandatory calorie counts on restaurant menus, as
regulatory responses to grievances originally aired in common law
courts.32 8 Second, Mortazavi describes the way in which tort litigation
influences private behavior, even outside the deterrent effect of
compensation. 329 This involves private behavior to "improve information
sharing, product features, and informally 'preempt' the need for regulatory
action." 330 Examples here include discontinuation of "natural" labeling3 3 1
and introduction of third party auditing for production practice claims, such
as "cage free" eggs.3 3 2
The food movement, according to Professor Mortazavi, is raising
important issues about the role of food in our culture and as a part of our
identity. 333 As such, food is not merely a source of both risk and benefit, but
a part of our national and community dialogues. 33 4 Tort, as a venue for
deliberative democracy, creates a uniquely equal and flexible forum for at
least beginning these new discussions-and debates-about the role of
food.33 5

Taken together, Professor Tai and Professor Mortazavi build a strong
foundation for the common law as a central and essential feature of food
law and policy. Professor Tai essentially demonstrates that tort is an
effective way to achieve policy goals, and Professor Mortazavi additionally
shows that the benefit of tort is more than meets the eye. 336 Tort is useful
not only for achieving legal victories, but also for creating a platform for a
necessary discourse that cannot take place as effectively in other
policymaking arenas.
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B. Value Hypocrisy and Policy Sincerity in the FoodMovement and
Common Law
I hope that the concepts of value hypocrisy and policy sincerity will be
a significant contribution to the general scholarship on procedural justice,
deliberative democracy, and other non-consequentialist methods of policy
analysis and design. I also expect that these concepts will be a necessary,
though not sufficient, framework for advancing an affirmative and positive
vision of the food movement.
I argue that in addition to legal victories and expanded discourse, the
common law includes inherent features that allow participants to exercise
the same values that motivate the food movement. In this way, win or lose,
by bringing food law and policy arguments into the common law courts,
litigants are partially realizing the same benefits---community
and
progressive
collaborative
decision-making,
empowerment,
traditionalism-they aim to realize through food system reform."' At the
very least, if this Article's earlier characterization of the food movement is
not convincing, the common law system allows movement participants to
pursue parallel efforts that can vindicate diverse goals in a way not possible
through legislation and regulation.
Section II of this Article describes some of the values that motivate the
food movement, and Section III describes characteristics of the common
law. There is significant overlap. The food movement is motivated by
individual empowerment facilitated by transparency and participation, a
sense of place, progress rooted in traditions, and dialogic face-to-face
relationships."' The common law provides, in fact requires, face-to-face
debate in a surprisingly collaborative forum; community norms; and
community acceptance of incremental changes that are based on existing
practice and expectations. 39 Tort empowers plaintiffs through an
opportunity to tell one's own story and make one's own argument.340 Tort
litigation puts a plaintiff and a defendant together; opponents must relate to
one another, which forces dialogue and relationships. 341 It "creates a
constant pressure on the parties to create a mutually satisfying
relationship ... ."342 Through its public performance and transparency, the
common law allows a community to hear both sides of a story and weigh in
337. See id. at 931 (arguing that tort has value in shaping the way political actors conceptualize
legal and policy issues around food).
338. Id. at 946, 975.
339. Bell, supra note 111, at 1218.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1220.
342. Id.
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34 3

and informally though community
conversations.
The consistency of values underlying the food movement is an
important premise in the logic of fitting the food movement into the
common law process. However, even if this Article paints too consistent a
picture of the food movement's values, the common law can still play an
important role. Dr. Phil Mount sees a much more diverse movement than I
describe in this article, and he stresses the need for attendant governance.3 45
"Given the multi-faceted priorities of farmers and consumers, establishing a
broadly-based approach to governance," writes Dr. Mount, "involves
reconciling diverse goals and values, rather than identifying shared goals
and values."3 46 To him, "collective decision making will reflect a diversity
of interests, interpretations and priorities. As such, decisions will generate
legitimacy more through a general satisfaction with the nature of the
process rather than the nature of the consensus."3 47 The common law, much
more than legislation and regulation, provides space for disparate values
and political goals. The common law is individualistic and collective,
public and private, just like eating. The common law "is one bridge by
which we pursue these simultaneous and inseparable interests." 348
The food movement's motivations may indeed be inconsistent, but so
is the common law. Professor Peter Bell nicely describes the common law
by reminding his readers that "[a]n accurate portrait of a blurry scene is a
blurry portrait."3 49 Like his portrait, the common law "is inconsistent. It
sends unclear messages. And, it reflects realities." 3 0 If the food movement
is not a movement at all, if it does not share sufficient values, then perhaps
the common law is an even more important instrument.
All of this value correspondence and institutional fit is unique, and
certainly distinguishes the common law as a food-policy venue from other
venues such as legislative and administrative decision-making. 351
Legislatures and administrators necessarily impose top-down requirements

343.

JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 6 (9th ed. 2017).

344. Bell, supra note 111, at 1218.
345. Mount, supra note 103, at 110.
346. Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
347. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
348. Marc Feldman, Essay, The Intellectual Ordering of Contemporary Tort Law, 51 MD. L.
REV. 980, 992 (1992).
349. Bell, supranote 111, at 1215.
350. Id. at 1214-15.
351. See id. at 1203, 1205 (explaining that neocontractual analysis exposes an emphasis on
individuals and procedures, rather than relationships and substance).
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on the food system. 352 Top-down impositions can achieve political goals,
from labeling requirements to environmental restrictions. In many cases,
they are necessary to achieving such goals, but they do not usually emerge
from a deeply rooted sense of place or robust community dialogue.3 5 3 The
politics of administrative decision-making can lead to the "agency cost
problem" and "suboptimal outcomes" when administrators lack knowledge
about a policy problem.3 5 4 Nevertheless, the common law can overcome
these shortcomings by providing some additional accountability and
individual empowerment. 3 For example, writing about environmental
protection, Professor Thomas McGarity says that "[t]ort law corrects for a
regulatory system that is too easily controlled by the very interests that it is
supposed to be controlling."35 Furthermore, as Professor Mortazavi also
noted, the common law gives the public direct access to justice on an
individual's own initiative, rather than limiting the already limited debate to
pre-determined technical issues.357
C. Value Hypocrisy and Policy SincerityApplied
Legislation and regulation may, at times, fit awkwardly with the food
movement, but they are still frequently necessary and appropriate for
advancing the movement's goals. The purpose of this Article is to introduce
the idea of value hypocrisy and policy sincerity, not to rule out other tools
for the food movement. Thus, a short survey of some food and farming
policies through the lens of hypocrisy and sincerity can demonstrate the sort
of inquiry that this new framework demands, irrespective of the general
type of governance (e.g., common law, regulatory, or private).
What better way to apply a new framework than by starting at the
beginning? Thomas Jefferson is the earliest, best champion of American
agriculture, having memorably called farmers "the most valuable
citizens . . . the most vigorous, the most independent, the most
virtuous . .. ."358 The "most spectAcular victory" of Jefferson's ideals was

352.

David Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of the Common Law, in The
BASIS FOR MODERN

CommoN LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 17 (Roger Meiners & Andrew Morriss eds., 2000).
353. Id.
354. Hylton, Economic Theory, supranote 160, at 676.
355. McGarity, Regulation andLitigation, supra note 147, at 372.
356. Id. at 373.
357.

Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporationsand Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law

the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L. J. 399, 409 (2002).
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the passage of the 1862 Homestead Act.359 That Act gave 160 acres of
western lands to any person who would actively farm that land.360 Using
Jefferson's expressed values for comparison, one could argue that the
motivations for this Act were to develop independent, self-sufficient
citizens. Certainly the Act did create more farms and farmers. 3 61 But the
primary tool in the Act-presentation of free land to all comers-does not
itself reflect economic self-sufficiency.3 62 It may instead have undermined
that value by grounding agriculture on government supports.363
In more recent times, the role of complex farm financing has become a
matter of public and private policy. 36 4 Finance is necessary for small farm
growth, large farm sustainability, tenants and owners, and others involved
in food production.3 65 Financing undoubtedly advances many goals of food
movement participants, but it also challenges some of their motivating
values. Financing through purely private arrangements or through
government-sponsored programs circumscribes the independence and the
rural character of farming and belies self-sufficiency. 366 If one ascribes to
M. Thomas Inge's assessment of agrarian values, finance also draws
farming closer to, rather than further from, the "urban life, capitalism, and
technology [that] destroy our independence and dignity while fostering vice
and weakness within us." 3 6 7

Over two decades after its passage, controversy around the Organic
Food Production Act 368 illustrates some additional concerns. The Act
enabled the now well-known USDA organic seal, which represents a
limited range of allowable agricultural production methods, including
restrictions on the type of pesticides and fertilizers that are permissible.3 69
Some organic food advocates oppose this system, even though it promotes
practices that are more closely aligned with the goals of the food
movement. "0 Opposition stems from what critics see as the Act's
359. Richard S. Kirkendall, Up to Now: A History of American Agriculture from Jefferson to
Revolution to Crisis, 4 AGRIC. HUM. VALUEs 4, 5 (1987).
360. The Homestead Act of 1862, H. R. Res. ch. 75, 37th Cong. (2d. Sess. 1862).
361.

SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at4.

362. See id. (describing the Homestead Act as a "safety valve" for farmers).
363. But see id. ("Nevertheless, the image of an independent and self sufficient land
owner . .. perseveres.").

364. Id. at 217.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 4-5.
368. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-23 (2012).
369. SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 664.
370. E.g., Tai, supra note 58, at 1077 (indicating that the Organic Foods Production Act
partially captures the values of "working with natural systems").
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"reductionist approach[, which] fails to fully capture the holistic worldview
of organic agriculture." 371 Likewise, a single federal scheme is a
questionable tool when "advocates of organic food differ in why they value
organic food production."3 7 2 Some argue that the corporate commodity food
industry controls the organic program; 373 others argue that a federal
program that tries to emulate what otherwise developed as a small-scale
innovation is simply impossible.3 74 In either case, there is a mismatch and
perhaps some value hypocrisy in this program.
While there is a certain sense of libertarianism that might tint these
critiques of mostly government-driven agriculture policy and the
recommendation of common law strategies, that is not the intent. Its
individual and case-by-case focus rather than generally applicable
restrictions are libertarian arguments for the common law. And, libertarian
ideals are tied up in the values that motivate the food movement." But
there are also examples of purely private instruments that fit the food
movement as awkwardly as regulatory options.
Wal-Mart's buy-local initiative is one example.3 76 At first glance, when
a retail behemoth determines to purchase more of its food locally, it is a
major triumph for the food movement. But in practice, "it is less clear
whether [Wal-Mart's buy-local initiative] fulfills some of the other, nontangible goals of the movement, such as creating a sense of connection and
community between consumers and farmers and educating consumers about
where their food comes from and how it is produced."37 7 More local food is
a political goal for the food movement, but the Wal-Mart case shows that a
policy achievement is worth less when the instrument does not reflect
motivating values.
It is necessary for legislators, regulators, and private businesses to
advance food policy, but it is not sufficient. Food progress also demands
general participation because that is the heart of food, and why it is a salient
issue with which we all intimately engage. Professor Hamilton writes that
"[d]emocracy isn't something out there others do for us; it is something

371. Id.
372. Id.
373. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 666-67 (emphasizing the food movement advocates'
desires to maintain the integrity of the organic food system).
374. See id. at 664 (explaining that the responsible government agencies experience "conflicting
loyalties" and "significant lobbying pressures").
375. See supra PartII (discussing libertarianism in the food movement).
376. -See Pollan, supra note 58, at 5 (indicating that many advocates of the food movement
question the integrity of Wal-Mart's buy-local programs).
377. Coit, supranote 102, at 62-63.
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close by that we are part of and share with others."378 This is similarly true
for the common law. It invites us to engage, and when we do, demands that
we share the experience-sometimes unpleasantly and sometimes
satisfyingly-with our opponents and our community. This is the sentiment
of food and the sentiment of common law, and therefore the confirmation
of policy sincerity.
D. Caveats, Limitations, and Warnings
I use the terms value hypocrisy and policy sincerity to explain this new
perspective. I do not mean to implicate any baggage from the philosophical
literature or other scholarship that discusses the deeper meanings of
hypocrisy and sincerity. Rather, using both words in their vernacular sense,
I hope to highlight two main points. The first point is that society seems to
have distaste for hypocrisy because it exposes a disconnection between
words and deeds.379 Hypocrisy is unwelcome because it is unsatisfactory
even though it does not necessarily make deeds less effective.380 It might
make deeds less meaningful; that is, deeds become mere instruments. The
crux of this first point, then, is that deeds-policy instruments-can be
more than mere instruments. Policy instruments can also be value
expressions, and implementation of these instruments can activate values in
the same way achieving a policy goal can activate values.
The second point of using the words hypocrisy and sincerity is to
express how an approach to policymaking can be instrumental even in noninstrumentalist pursuits. Where hypocrisy is unsatisfying, it can undermine
trust in the deeds that do not connect to words. In policy terms, when a
policy instrument shares values with a policy goal-when it is sincere-it is
satisfying. Satisfaction with a policy instrument can lead to greater support
for that instrument. Philosopher John Dewey, for instance, was a champion
of deliberative democracy not only because it was a good tool for producing
social goals, but also because it was a satisfying way to produce these goals
and therefore to build confidence and effectiveness. 8
A few other caveats are also called for here. First, this section is
intended to demonstrate the way that the common law calls on the same or
very similar values as those motivating the food movement. I hope that this
378. Hamilton, FoodDemocracy, supra note 72, at 22.
379. Jillian Jordan, Roseanna Sommers & David Rand, The Real Problem With Hypocrisy, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/opinion/sunday/the-real-problem-withhypocrisy.htmi.
380. Id.
381. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL INQUIRY 158-60
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is a tight connection, but I do not mean to imply that common law is
somehow the same as, or a substitute for, an improved food system. Simply
using common law causes of action to address food policy is obviously not
sufficient.
Second, with respect to the characteristics I have identified in the
common law, I do not mean to imply that things such as community
empowerment and collaborative decision-making are the purpose of the
common law. Perhaps they are, but that is a conversation better carried on
by others. Rather, I hope to highlight these characteristics of the common
law as emergent benefits of the process.
Third, in describing the policy sincerity that the common law provides
vis-i-vis food policy, I absolutely do not mean to limit food advocacy to
common law litigation. I hope the consideration of hypocrisy and sincerity
will add to existing scholarship, such as that of professors Tai and
Mortazavi, and enhance interest in the common law as a food policy tool. I
hope that this consideration will not detract from efforts to use legislative,
administrative, and private governance mechanisms as well.
Finally, a severability clause is needed. Although I have addressed both
food policy and value hypocrisy together, I hope that each piece can stand
on its own. This Article makes two distinct arguments. The first argument is
that policy instrument choice should consider the fit between the values that
motivate a policy and the values embodied within the instrument. The
second argument is that there is a good fit between the values that motivate
food law and policy and the values embodied within the common law.
V.

CONCLUSION

All the talk of motivating values and fundamental purpose could give
the impression that philosophical formalism should rule the food
movement, and a priori dogmas should restrict the movement's legal and
policy efforts. The opposite is true. This Article is meant to deepen a
pragmatic approach to policy. Many activists today-those I have
elsewhere called pragtivists--describe their work as pragmatic, but they
tend to aim only for "what works" to achieve nominal, goal-centric
victories, while ignoring the important aspects of instrument choice and
development.3 82 Value sincerity does not demand that policy advocates or
policymakers tie their work to any ideologically pure set of values.

382. See generally Galperin, Trust Me, supra note 184, at 452 (positing that "pragtivists"
disregard the complexities of instrument choice and development).
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Quite the contrary, value sincerity recognizes the diversity of
motivating values, whatever they are, and proposes that policy advocates
and policymakers consider the way that these values, whatever they are, are
reflected in legal instruments. This reflection, coherence, or sincerity is not
a philosophical imperative. It is a pragmatic opportunity for actualizing
values, whatever they are, twice over: once by achieving the policy goal
that stems from those values, whatever they are; and again by utilizing a
legal instrument that itself exercises the values, whatever they are.
This pragmatic depth is achieved by eschewing value hypocrisy in
pursuit of policy sincerity. This Article argues that, while a given policy
instrument may help achieve a policy goal, it is important to look beyond
the goal and ask what values motivate it in the first place. Where a policy
instrument helps achieve the goal-but in so doing undermines or ignores
motivating values-it is policy hypocrisy. The values embedded in or
reflected by the instrument do not match the values that inspired the goal.
For example, Wal-Mart's local food initiative may facilitate the policy goal
of increasing local food consumption, but it,.does not match the values of
face-to-face relationships, transparency, and community empowerment that
inspired the local food goal in the first place. Advocates and policymakers
can achieve policy sincerity when they help people to satisfy their values
both in using a legal instrument and, when that instrument accomplishes its
policy goal, in seeing the impacts of a policy. The case of Wendinger v.
ForstFarms, Inc. may be an example insofar as the case was a legal victory
against industrial agriculture and represented the values of individual
empowerment, community coherence, and progressive traditionalism. 383
In addition to sketching some ideas about policy hypocrisy and value
sincerity, this Article further suggests that participants in the food
movement may find a sincere match between their motivating values and
the nature of the common law as a policy instrument. The food movement
is unquestionably a diverse and sometimes conflicting assemblage, but it is
roughly tied together by the values of individual empowerment,
transparency and participation, sense of place, progress rooted in traditions,
and dialogic, face-to-face relationships. Existing scholarship shows the
ways in which the common law is already an effective tool for achieving
some policy goals of the food movement. But the common law is also a
sincere policy fit because it enables face-to-face and collaborative debate
grounded in community norms, striving for incremental progress that is
rooted in tradition.

383. Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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Today's incredibly divisive politics is probably driven in some part by
the fact that we talk about political games and who wins, but we too rarely
talk about what we ultimately want and why. If nothing else, an effort to
avoid value hypocrisy and find policy sincerity forces greater consideration
of motivating values-of what we really want. Perhaps this is too
optimistic, as unfounded optimism is a chronic problem of mine, but if we
attend to values, we may find that the American public has more in
common than our politics project.

